Catholic University Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 3 Spring 2015

Article 8

6-10-2015

A Trustee’s Fiduciary Duties at the Start and End of Administration
Robert Whitman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert Whitman, A Trustee’s Fiduciary Duties at the Start and End of Administration, 64 Cath. U. L. Rev.
707 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol64/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

A Trustee’s Fiduciary Duties at the Start and End of Administration
Cover Page Footnote
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School.

This article is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol64/iss3/8

A TRUSTEE’S FIDUCIARY DUTIES AT THE START
AND END OF ADMINISTRATION
Robert Whitman+
I. FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL UTILITY OF CONTRACT LAW .................................709
A. Fairness and Equitable Theory Dominate Early Contract Law
to Protect Citizens.............................................................................709
B. To Meet the Needs of a Changing Society, Judicial Interpretation
Recharacterizes Adequacy of Consideration ....................................710
II. THE ORIGIN AND ESSENCE OF TRUST LAW ...............................................712
III. LAW APPLIED AT THE TERMINATION OF A TRUST ....................................714
A. Duties Between Fiduciaries and Beneficiaries May Not
Always Be Clearly Defined ...............................................................714
B. New Case Law May Change the Law Regarding Trust
Administration ..................................................................................716
1. The Majority Found No Breach by the Corporate
Fiduciary ..................................................................................716
2. The Dissent Found Breaches by the Corporate
Fiduciary ..................................................................................716
3. The Dissent Found the Fiduciary Breached the Duty to
Disclose All Material Facts ......................................................718
4. Comparing the Majority and Dissent ..........................................718
IV. CONTRACT LAW AND TRUST LAW CLASHES PRIOR TO THE
CREATION OF THE TRUST .....................................................................721
V. THE UTC REQUIRES MANDATORY NOTIFICATIONS TO BENEFICIARIES
REGARDING THE TRUST........................................................................725
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................726
Prior to the creation of a trust and at its termination, ambiguity may exist in
regard to the extent of the trustee’s fiduciary duties. This uncertainty leads to
litigation1 and a need for clarification as to when fiduciary duties start and end.2
+

Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School.
1. While this Article deals exclusively with trusts, similar questions may arise regarding the
administration of estates. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to “NonClients”: Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other
Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 66970 (1994) (discussing the difficulty of
determining fiduciary duties for disputes in estate law between companies and individuals).
2. See, e.g., Greene v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 516 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(finding no fiduciary duty existed between a corporate trustee and the plaintiff in connection with
a series of trusts because the plaintiff confused the duties of a co-executor and trustee); Melanie B.
Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67,
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It is argued that, where fiduciary duties do not exist, contract law may be found
to govern the rights of the settlor, the trustee,3 and the beneficiaries.4 Under the
principles of modern contract law, certain conduct may be permitted that would
not be acceptable if fiduciary duties existed.5
This Article will discuss three common situations: (1) the seeking of a receipt
and release by a corporate fiduciary upon an informal termination of a trust; (2)
the acceptance of terms that a corporate fiduciary requires prior to a settlor
appointing a corporate fiduciary as a trustee; and (3) the need for a trustee to
give notice to trust beneficiaries. At each of these points, clear conflicts can
arise between principles of contract law and trust law. This Article suggests that
a keen awareness of these potential clashes can help achieve fairer agreements
and better trust administration. Further, this Article focuses on whether it is
appropriate to validate contract provisions agreed upon prior to the
establishment of a trust, or provisions of a trust agreement, when those terms are
sought by the trustee and possibly suggest that the trustee is overreaching or
exploitating an advantage.
Part I of this Article analyzes the historical trajectory of contract law since the
eighteenth century, and provides a framework through which one can understand
the preliminary contractarian provisions of a trust. Part II of this Article explores
the development of trust law that serves to protect the interests of the trustee, the
settlor, and the beneficiary. Part III discusses the legal standing of a corporate
trustee’s power over a settlor or beneficiary, and describes the latest case law
determining the scope of a corporate trustee when bargaining the parameters of
a trust agreement. Part IV demonstrates the typical standard form agreement
that settlors can expect when employing a corporate trustee. Part IV also
describes the strengths and weaknesses of such an agreement and considers how
a corporate trustee may attempt to take advantage of a settlor. Finally, Part V
illustrates the Uniform Trust Code (UTC)’s provisions regarding the mandatory
disclosure requirements of a trust. These provisions indicate that a corporate

9293 (2005) (noting that the ability for corporate trustees to stray from the formal standards of
fiduciary duties makes “[l]itigation . . . more costly and settlement less likely” (footnote omitted)).
3. With respect to imposed fiduciary obligations, “a trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,
is then the standard of behavior.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
Accordingly, the trustee is required to put the interest of the beneficiary above his own. This Article
utilizes the term “trustee” to refer to a corporate fiduciary, but the issues discussed also pertain to
an individual trustee or co-trustees.
4. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law in Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
65960 (1995).
5. Cf. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595,
59596 (1997) (noting that the range and expectations of behavior for a fiduciary varies depending
on the field and factual situation); Langbein, supra note 4, at 64041 (describing the changing
powers and behaviors attributable to trustees in light of the change in fiduciary duties and trust
law).
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trustee has particular duties to a beneficiary that may alter his relationship and
duty of loyalty to the original settlor of the trust.
This Article does not attempt to suggest specific new legal rules that might
resolve all of the situations in which a clash of doctrines may occur. Ultimately,
new rules will likely be developed by statute or court decisions. As of now, it is
understandable that courts may respond differently to various factual patterns.
Awareness of the potential for uncertainty and a clash of doctrines will allow
corporate fiduciaries acting as trustees to appropriately tailor their actions to be
consistent with their fiduciary duties, thereby minimizing the need for litigation.
I. FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL UTILITY OF CONTRACT LAW
A. Fairness and Equitable Theory Dominate Early Contract Law to Protect
Citizens
The periods of contract development pertinent to trust administration and
relevant to this Article took place in the United States and England in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Contract law dictates that contracts may be void
if they contain unconscionable terms or were formed while one party was under duress;6
“[m]uch of the law of contract is concerned with ensuring that agreements are arrived at
in a way that meets at least minimum standards respecting both parties’ understanding
of, and freedom to decide whether to enter into, the transactions.”7 Courts determined
that certain agreements went against public policy, such as agreements to perform civil
crimes.8 Rules were also formulated to provide protection against self-serving guardians
for minors and disadvantaged persons.9 Other rules created particularized contract
requirements to protect against “the assumption of a legally binding obligation to confer
a gift of money or other gratuitous benefit upon another.”10
In the eighteenth century, courts would determine whether a breach of contract
existed based on the principles of equity and fairness before a promise was

6. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON
CONTRACTS 31517, 388421 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the development and impact of duress
and unconscionability in contract law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) (“If
a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”).
7. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Contract, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/135270/contract/21771/Fairness-and-social-utility (last updated
May 6, 2014) (highlighting the element of fairness around which contract law revolves).
8. Id. See Gamble v. Connolly, 943 A.2d 202, 210 (N.J. 2007) (“No contract can be
sustained if it is inconsistent with the public interest or detrimental to the public good.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 178 (providing when terms of a contract violate public
policy and render the contract unenforceable).
9. Von Mehren, supra note 7.
10. Id.
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deemed enforceable.11 This approach was common in cases in which one party was
able to set the terms of a contract without a real chance for bargaining.12 Courts often
looked to the actual words and documents that created the contract rather than
what the parties meant by those words and actions.13
Both the English and American legal systems demonstrated an equitable
theory that tempered the freedom of contract between parties with principles of
fairness and justice.14 Where contractual obligations clearly departed in a large
degree from the ideals of honesty and fairness, the contract would likely not be
upheld.15 When equitable theory was still the predominant approach, contract
law in the American colonies commonly applied the rules for exchange of title
to land.16 The colonial economy was rural, agricultural, and pre-industrial.17
While trade and commerce were growing, locally based market relations tended
to be the norm.18 In more remote areas, subsistence agriculture and barter still
often prevailed.19
B. To Meet the Needs of a Changing Society, Judicial Interpretation
Recharacterizes Adequacy of Consideration
Beginning in the eighteenth century and continuing into the early nineteenth
century, an equity court would carefully examine adequacy of consideration.
For example, Seymour v. Delancey20 involved a contract for the exchange of two
country farms in New York for a one-third interest in two city lots.21 The action
for specific performance of the exchange was brought against the descendant of
the party who was to convey the two farms.22 The case was first heard by
11. Morton J. Horwitz, Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV.
917, 92324 (1974) (describing how courts accounted for fairness).
12. Id. at 950; see also Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 43031 (2000).
13. James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English Contract Theory: The View
from Lord Mansfield’s Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1958 (1988) (quoting P.S. ATIYAH, THE
RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 419 (1979)); see also von Mehren, supra note 7 (“[A]
written agreement may be interpreted against the party who drafts or chooses the language. Or the court may prefer
an interpretation it finds to be in accord with the public interest.”).
14. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 917, 92324.
15. Id. at 923 (“The most direct expression of the eighteenth century theory was the wellestablished doctrine that equity courts would refuse the specific enforcement of any contract in
which they determined that the consideration was inadequate.” (footnote omitted)).
16. Id. at 920.
17. EDWIN J. PERKINS, THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA 41 (1980).
18. See id. at 49 (highlighting the more rapid growth of commercial markets in the north
compared to the middle and southern colonies).
19. Id. at 104.
20. 6 Johns. Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1822), rev’d sub nom. Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cow. 445 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1824).
21. Id. at 223.
22. Id.
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Chancellor James Kent.23 According to his interpretation of the “weight of
testimony,” the two farms were worth $14,000 at the date of the agreement, and
the one-third interest in the lots was worth $5,000.24
While the witnesses called for valuation disagreed, Kent stated that “I am
satisfied, that . . . the village lots were not worth half the value of the country
farms.”25 Kent proceeded to announce that “[i]t is a settled principle, that
a specific performance of a contract of sale is not a matter of course, but
rests entirely in the discretion of the Court, upon a view of all the
circumstances.”26 “A Court of equity,” Kent went on, “must be satisfied
that the claim for a deed is fair and just, and reasonable, and the contract
equal in all its parts, and founded on an adequate consideration, before
[the court] will interpose with this extraordinary assistance.”27
After examining a series of English decisions, Kent confessed that in
the most recent cases of the time “there [was] a doubt thrown over the
question, whether inadequacy of price alone, though not so great as to be
evidence of fraud, [would] be sufficient, . . . to withhold the decree for a
specific performance.”28 Apparently, however, Kent was more struck with the
preponderance of earlier cases in which no such doubts were raised. He said:
There is a very great weight of authority against enforcing a
contract, where the consideration is so inadequate as to render it
a hard bargain, and an unequal and an unreasonable bargain; the
argument is exceedingly strong against it in such cases, when it
is considered that if equity acts at all, it must act ex vigore,[29]
and carry the contract into execution, with unmitigated severity:
Whereas, if the party be sent to law, to submit his case to a jury,
relief can be afforded in damages, with a moderation agreeable
to equity and good conscience, and when the claims and
pretensions of each party can be duly attended to, and be
admitted to govern the assessment.30
Kent refused specific performance after observing that, under the civil law
and comparable foreign laws, judges rescinded contracts for the sale of land if

23. Seymour, 3 Cow. at 448 (naming Chancellor Kent as the maker of the lower court
decision).
24. Seymour, 6 Johns. Ch. at 22324.
25. Id. at 224.
26. Id. at 22425.
27. Id. at 225.
28. Id. at 231.
29. Ex vigore refers to ex propio vigore, a Latin term meaning “by its own force.” Anna Su,
Speech Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality and the First Amendment, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1373,
1398 (2014).
30. Seymour, 6 Johns. Ch. at 232.
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the price was below half the value of the land.31 Kent’s refusal was reversed
in 1824 in Seymour v. Delancy32 by the New York Court for the Trial of
Impeachment and the Correction of Errors, a unique New York judicial
institution that is now extinct, which consisted of the Members of the New
York Senate, the Chief Judge of the New York Supreme Court, and the
Equity Chancellor.33
By the late nineteenth century and thereafter, the country’s expansion and the
need for progress outweighed concerns for fairness in contract formation.34
Court interference with deals clearly favoring powerful corporations represented
by large and powerful law firms disappeared.35 This judicial protection was
replaced by the contract rule of law that adequacy of consideration will not be
questioned when there is a bargained-for exchange.36
Thus, contract law was altered to conform to the need of the capitalist nation.
The law worked to assist the expansion of trade and the growth of the nation—
in spite of the likelihood that the stronger party could take advantage of the
weaker party—so long as actual fraud could not be proven.37 Weaker parties
were, and continue to be, taken advantage of under the sanction of contract law.38
II. THE ORIGIN AND ESSENCE OF TRUST LAW
In medieval England, land ownership was based on the feudal system, and
situations arose that required the appointment of one person to look after lands
owned by another.39 For example, when a knight went off to fight in the
Crusades, he conveyed management and ownership of his lands to a trusted
individual during his absence.40 The common oral understanding provided for
re-conveyance of ownership back to the knight upon his return, or, if he died,
conveyance of the land to his family.41 If the manager refused to return
ownership on one of those occasions, common law courts would not recognize

31. Id. at 233.
32. 3 Cow. 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
33. The Court of Appeals of the State of New York, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/nyctap/court/background.htm (last visited May 11, 2015).
34. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 95355.
35. See id. at 94142.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 94546.
38. Id. (“[N]ineteenth century courts and doctrinal writers . . . were able to elaborate a system
that allowed judges to pick and choose among those groups in the populations that would be its
beneficiaries.”).
39. THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 50608 (5th
ed. 1956) (“In the days when feudalism was at its height, the vassal held the land of the lord.”).
40. Id. at 57677 (noting that this person was normally a friend or neighboring lord).
41. F. W. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARV. L. REV. 127, 12930 (1894) (describing
this type of conveyance as giving one’s “land to another ‘to the use’ of a third”).
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a claim.42 There was no legal form of action through which courts could grant
relief.43
However, it was possible to gain relief in another way. The disgruntled
crusader, or his family, could directly petition the king, who would refer the
matter to his Lord Chancellor.44 The Lord Chancellor could decide the case and
dispense equity in the king’s name, according to his conscience.45
In the fifteenth century, the Lord Chancellor, sitting in the equity Court of
Chancery, would regularly recognize the proved claim.46 The crusader later
became known as the settlor, his family became known as the beneficiary, and
the trusted friend who failed to keep his promise became known as the trustee.47
The transaction was originally termed “adopus” or “to the use of.”48 In time it
became known as “use,” and ultimately, a “trust.”49
As aforementioned, the law of contracts developed in the nineteenth century
in such a way that the stronger party could arrange a deal to allow him to take
advantage of the other party with impunity.50 The stronger party, within limits,
could keep the advantages of his bargain.51 The law of private express trusts
developed in a very different way. The trustee was considered a “fiduciary,”52
and the law of trusts vigorously expounded on the need for the fiduciary to do
equity and put the needs of the beneficiary above his own.53 The law of fiduciary
duty strictly prohibited the trustee from using his position to take advantage of
the beneficiaries.54 In the famous words of Judge Benjamin Cardozo:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
42. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 3
(5th ed. 1973).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (noting that the chancellors were usually “churchmen” who had a duty to uphold the
fairness of the law).
46. Id. (noting that recognition of these suits in a less formal form went back to the thirteenth
century).
47. Id. § 1.
48. PLUCKNETT, supra note 39, at 576, 577.
49. Id. (“The word ‘trust’ had a more general meaning, however, and . . . seem[ed] to apply
to any case where one person was under a moral duty to deal with property for another’s benefit.”).
50. See supra notes 3438 and accompanying text.
51. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 94652 (discussing how the “will theory of contract” emerged
in the nineteenth century, supplanting equitable principles of “objective value” and “just price” that
had previously provided some protection for the weaker party).
52. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 42, § 1.
53. Id. § 95 (explaining the trustee’s duty of loyalty to the beneficiary).
54. Id.
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sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
“disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions. Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any
judgment of this court.55
III. LAW APPLIED AT THE TERMINATION OF A TRUST
A. Duties Between Fiduciaries and Beneficiaries May Not Always Be
Clearly Defined
Traditionally, trusts were testamentary and supervised by courts.56 By statute,
a final fiduciary accounting was to be presented to the supervising court and
copies were to be provided to appropriate beneficiaries.57 Today, more
commonly than ever, living revocable trusts are employed for estate planning
purposes in order to avoid costly court supervision.58 When terminating a
revocable living trust, a corporate fiduciary serving as the trustee has several
choices:
1. Distribute to the appropriate beneficiaries upon first providing them
with a fiduciary accounting and receiving a receipt and release from
all of the beneficiaries;59
2. File a final fiduciary accounting with an appropriate court in order
to receive the court’s approval;60 or
3. Provide a fiduciary accounting to the appropriate beneficiaries and
distribute, only asking for a receipt, thereby only relying for protection
on the running of the applicable statute of limitations.61
55. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted).
56. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 42, § 1.
57. T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 160002 (2007)
(describing the different types of information that each type of beneficiary is entitled to receive).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959) (noting the trustee’s legal duty to
provide the beneficiary with any requested information).
58. FREDERICK M. SEMBLER & MICHAEL J. FEINFELD, PLANNING AN ESTATE: A
GUIDEBOOK OF PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 129 (4th ed. 2014). See A. James Casner, Estate
Planning—Avoidance of Probate, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 108, 109 (1960).
59. Guidelines for Individual Executors & Trustees, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/real_property_trust_estate/resources/estate_planning/guidelines_for_individual_executors
_trustees.html (last visited May 11, 2015).
60. Id.
61. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-307 (West 2014). See Kevin D. Millard, The Trustee’s Duty
to Inform and Report Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 373, 384
(2005).
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The advantage of requiring court approval of the fiduciary accounting, or
requiring receipts and releases, is that doing so might protect the corporate
fiduciary if the beneficiaries later raise actionable questions.62 The difficulty is
that neither the court order approving the account nor the received receipt and
release will prevent the beneficiary from later raising questions where there is a
claim regarding misleading information or a lack of full disclosure on the final
accounting.63
Uncertainty remains as to whether a fiduciary may refuse to make a
distribution mandated by the governing instrument unless receipts and releases
are forthcoming. If the trustee may withhold distribution until he receives
receipts and releases, is this putting the interests of the fiduciary above the
interests of the beneficiaries? Beyond that, the practical disadvantage of
requiring a receipt and release prior to distribution is that it may cause the
beneficiaries to become concerned with the idea that they may be giving up
rights, which may cause them to retain independent counsel. Protracted
litigation may follow.
Distribution without requiring releases minimizes protection for the corporate
fiduciary but allows the fiduciary to properly and confidently carry out his or her
fiduciary duties until the final termination of the trust.64 By receiving a prompt
distribution without a demand for receipts and releases, beneficiaries may not
feel it necessary to retain independent counsel, and litigation could be avoided.
Arguably, threatening the beneficiaries with substantial costs by filing the final
accounting in court (unless receipts and releases are forthcoming) places the
fiduciary in a position where he will likely seek to protect his own interests over
the beneficiaries’ interests, thereby raising the issue of a fiduciary duties breach.
Bargaining for and granting receipts and releases may be seen as contract
negotiation. In consideration for the corporate fiduciary giving up its right to
seek a court review and approval of the final accounting, the beneficiaries grant
the receipts and releases. Depending on the circumstances, the application of
trust law may not condone this common practice,65 and lack of care in how

62. Julia Zajac & Robert Whitman, Fiduciary Accounting Statutes for the 21st Century, 36
ACTEC L.J. 443, 44849 (2010) (quoting Millard, supra note 61, at 375). See Guidelines for
Individual Executors & Trustees, supra note 59.
63. See, e.g., Hastings v. PNC Bank, NA, 54 A.3d 714, 728 (Md. 2012) (finding that a release
form did not protect the bank-trustee from actions based on fraud or mistake).
64. Id. at 73536 (discussing the broader protections that come with releases). But cf. Millard,
supra note 61, at 39394 (noting arguments against obtaining permission, or even telling the
beneficiary about the trust, but disclaiming their importance).
65. See Robert Whitman & Kumar Paturi, Improving Mechanisms For Resolving Complaints
of Powerless Trust Beneficiaries, 16 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 64, 7985 (2002) (providing examples
of situations in which trustees and beneficiaries seek court oversight).
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receipts and releases are requested can lead to litigation.66 In the future, new
trust law may arise to radically change current practice.67
B. New Case Law May Change the Law Regarding Trust Administration
An indication of a trend in new law with regard to trust administration is best
illustrated by a recent case, Hastings v. PNC Bank.68 In Hastings, beneficiaries
of a testamentary trust brought an action in Baltimore County Circuit Court
against the trustee, PNC Bank (PNC).69 The beneficiaries alleged, among other
things, that the fiduciary “improperly” asked the beneficiaries to execute general
releases prior to making a final distribution.70 The trustee counterclaimed for
termination of the trust and filed motions for summary judgment.71 The court
issued an order assuming jurisdiction of the trust and granted the trustee’s
motions for summary judgment.72
1. The Majority Found No Breach by the Corporate Fiduciary
The beneficiaries appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which
affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision.73 The beneficiaries then sought a writ of
certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted.74 By a four-to-three decision,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Special Appeals.75 The majority first
held that the trustee did not breach “its duty of loyalty in this case merely by
asking Petitioners . . . to execute a reasonable release and indemnity clause.”76
The majority also found that the terms of the release and indemnity clause were
not overly broad.77
2. The Dissent Found Breaches by the Corporate Fiduciary
Three judges dissented strongly.78 The dissenting judges pointed out that
PNC, the corporate fiduciary, prepared to distribute the trust’s assets to the
66. See, e.g., Hastings, 54 A.3d at 723.
67. Whitman & Paturi, supra note 65, at 91.
68. 54 A.3d 714 (Md. 2012).
69. Id. at 718.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 718, 734 (noting the three dissenting judges).
76. Id. at 726.
77. Id. (finding that PNC had not “place[d] impermissibly PNC’s interests before those of
[the] Petitioners”).
78. Id. at 73441 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s approach will
“encourage more widespread use of such unlawful releases, and enable banks and other trustees to
cite this case to justify other breaches” by the corporate fiduciary).
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beneficiaries and sent a letter to them that included, among other things, an
accounting of the entire trust and a “Waiver, Receipt, Release and
Indemnification Agreement” (Release).79 The letter explained that each
beneficiary would receive his or her share of the trust when all of the
beneficiaries had returned the signed Release.80 In addition, the Release
provided that “‘the Trust ha[d] terminated; and . . . the parties in interest ha[d]
requested that PNC distribute the Trust assets . . . without the filing, audit and
adjudication of an account of PNC’s administration of the Trust with a court of
competent jurisdiction.’”81
Therefore, upon signing the Release, the
beneficiaries relinquished their right to formally challenge PNC’s administration
of the trust funds. The Release requested, among other things, that prior to
signing the Release and in lieu of a formal court accounting the beneficiaries:
“(1) acknowledge that they had consulted with an attorney (or had chosen
affirmatively not to do so); (2) declare that they had reviewed the books, records,
and statements of the Trust, and; (3) approve of PNC’s handling and
administration of the Trust.”82 The Release also contained an indemnity clause
releasing PNC from liability and requiring the beneficiaries to compensate PNC
or secure PNC against legal responsibility for any expenses related to the
termination of the trust; this clause became the subject of litigation.83
The beneficiaries retained counsel and objected to PNC’s plan for
distribution.84
The beneficiaries mainly argued against the Release’s
requirement that the beneficiaries execute the Release before receiving their
distribution, and they claimed that the Release terms were “far too favorable to
PNC.”85 In response, PNC argued that signing the Release was not required
prior to distribution of the trust, and that it could seek a determination from the
courts to obtain a final accounting and termination of the trust, thus preserving
the protection it had intended to gain from the Release.86 PNC also argued that
the opportunity to execute Releases was offered to the beneficiaries as a matter
of industry practice, “since the majority of beneficiaries prefer to terminate their
trust via private agreement instead of petitioning a court.”87
Nonetheless, while still demanding the Release or court approval of the final
accounting, PNC did release a partial distribution to each of the beneficiaries in
response to their objections.88 The court considered PNC’s required form of
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 720 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 72021.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks ommitted).
Id. at 72122 (awarding each of the beneficiaries $33,319.97).

718

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:707

Release to be roughly the same terminology that the court would have provided
if the matter had been formally adjudicated and had the court had approved the
fiduciary accounting.89 The Maryland Court of Appeals found that neither party
advanced the issue of whether PNC breached its duty to provide all material
facts to the beneficiaries.90
3. The Dissent Found the Fiduciary Breached the Duty to Disclose All
Material Facts
Although the majority held that the parties did not brief or argue the issue of
whether PNC properly communicated all material facts and law to the
beneficiaries, the dissent felt that this question was before the court and was
essential to deciding the case.91 The dissent believed that the issue before the
court—whether a trustee has a right to present a Release providing greater
protection for PNC than a court order as a precondition to any distribution—
could not be decided unless the issue of proper and full communication was
considered.92 The dissent posited that PNC had clearly breached its fiduciary
duty to inform the remaindermen of all material facts.93
According to the dissent, by refusing to make any distribution unless the
beneficiaries signed an overly broad Release, PNC forced the matter to a formal
court accounting.94 That process was far more expensive and time consuming
than if PNC had presented a Release that only afforded PNC the same
protections as a court order, or if PNC had simply asked for (rather than
demanded) a Release and a receipt, or refrained from asking for a receipt or a
Release.95
By not making a prompt distribution, the dissent argued, PNC limited the
ability of the beneficiaries to retain their own counsel and take action to protect
their rights.96 PNC may have sought to deny the beneficiaries the assets to which
they were then entitled in order to prevent the beneficiaries from funding formal
litigation.
4. Comparing the Majority and Dissent
The majority found that requesting the Release was not unlawful, but that a
trustee has the duty to provide the beneficiaries “with ‘full information and
89. Id. at 72627 (noting that the Release’s terms “track closely, although not perfectly” the
wording the court would have used).
90. Id. at 724, 734 (noting that the Petitioners had only put forth strictly legal arguments and
that the Release did not ask the parties to re-evaluate any interest in the relationship).
91. Id. at 739 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 73940.
93. Id. at 740.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 734 (majority opinion).
96. Id. at 73638 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
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complete understanding of the facts.’”97 However, both the majority and dissent
in Hastings agreed that a trustee is not protected from fraudulent concealment;
the majority stated:
It is also worth noting that, no matter the terms of the clause itself, the
Release Agreement could not protect PNC from liability arising from
fraud, material mistake or irregularity on PNC’s part . . . . “Because a
trustee has an affirmative duty to disclose relevant information, a
matter involving sensitive issues must be revealed in the accounting
with sufficient clarity to invite attention to the issue if the court order
is to protect the trustee as a matter of issue preclusion.” “Of course, a
trustee who in rendering the account is guilty of fraud or fraudulent
concealment is not protected.”[] Moreover, “this Court has
consistently held that fraud can and will invalidate an otherwisecomplete release of liability.”98
To validate this assertion, the majority relied on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,
which says that “[a] particular transaction that would otherwise violate a trustee’s
duty of loyalty may be authorized by consent properly obtained from or on behalf
of all of the trust beneficiaries.”99 The dissent even more fully discussed this issue,
stating that “[t]he Majority brushes off the Trustee’s over-reaching, preferring
instead to focus on the doctrine that ‘a trustee may engage in self-interested
course of action so long as the beneficiaries provide valid, informed consent.’”100 The
dissent believed that the majority saw PNC’s attempt to have the beneficiaries sign
the Release as “at bottom, [an] arm’s length request to exchange increased
protection and indemnity for a quicker and less costly distribution of trust
funds.”101
The majority comforted itself with the idea that the beneficiaries “retained the
choice to accede to that request, perhaps negotiate [one] not as broad in its
protection of PNC, or simply reject it.”102 However, the majority’s analysis of
consent fails to appropriately incorporate a beneficiary’s inability to properly
consent to a breach of fiduciary duty without having full and complete information
relating to the breach.103 The dissent noted this point, and further pointed out
that “in obtaining the consent, the ‘trustee must not violate other fiduciary duties,
such as the duty of prudence or impartiality.’”104

97.
1955)).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 726 n.10 (majority opinion) (quoting McDaniel v. Hughes, 111 A.2d 204, 210 (Md.
See id. at 734 (noting that PNC’s actions did not violate Maryland law).
Id. at 72829 (citations omitted).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(3) (2007).
Hastings, 54 A.3d at 739 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
Id. at 728 (majority opinion).
Id.
See id. at 735 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
Id. at 739 n.13 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. g (2007)).
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The dissent reiterated that in dealings between trustees and beneficiaries, the
trustee must ensure that the beneficiary has all pertinent information and fully
understands the implications of the transaction.105 It said:
This is particularly true when the trustee has superior knowledge of the
transaction at issue, such as when the trustee is an attorney for the
beneficiaries and is “experienced in the law.” In those instances,
“[t]ransactions for the personal advantage of a trustee . . . are even more
improper than similar dealings between laymen,” and “[t]o sustain such
a transaction [sic] the trustee must show that there was a full and
complete disclosure on his part of all the facts essential to an intelligent
understanding by the beneficiaries of the subject matter and the
consequences of the transaction.”106
From the dissent’s point of view, PNC failed to adequately advise the
beneficiaries about their rights or describe the potential consequences of signing
the Release.107 The dissent specifically included a footnote to elucidate that
the Agreement not only failed to contain full information, but it also
contained a misrepresentation. The [Release] stated that the
Beneficiaries—rather than PNC—was the party initiating distribution of
trust funds without court approval. Although this may seem like a
minor misrepresentation, because there are four beneficiaries in this
case (each receiving the [Release]), this statement has a great potential
to mislead. After all, each of the four beneficiaries may have gotten the
impression that the other three beneficiaries had requested distribution of
trust funds in this manner, when, in fact, they had not.108
Importantly, the dissent explained that PNC did not “explain to the Beneficiaries
how the liability protection it sought under the [Release] was more favorable to
the bank than the protection it would have received upon the court’s approval of
a final accounting.”109 It said:
PNC seemingly was impatient with explanations. Although the
Beneficiaries insisted upon explanation of PNC’s tax and fees
calculations, those requests seem to have irritated PNC. In one letter
to the Beneficiaries, PNC wrote: “The trust document that you request
is in your possession. . . . Your other questions about fees and taxes are
adequately addressed in [prior] correspondence to you. Nevertheless,
I will attempt to dissect this for you.”110
The dissent went on to observe the following about PNC’s communications
with the beneficiaries:
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 739 (quoting McDaniel v. Hughes, 111 A.2d 204, 210 (Md. 1955)).
Id. at 73940 (quoting McDaniel, 111 A.2d at 21011).
Id. at 740 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 740 n.14.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 740 n.15.
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Furthermore, PNC’s demanding tone demonstrates that PNC failed to
give the Beneficiaries “full and complete information” or explain that
they were free to reject the [Release’s] sweeping provisions and go to
court. In at least two communications with the Beneficiaries, PNC
stated that—unless the Beneficiaries executed the Agreement—it would
not be “in a position” to distribute the trust funds. For instance, in the
closing line of the letter accompanying the [Release], PNC stated:
“Upon receipt of the executed Releases from all of the distributees, we
will be in a position to have the cash disbursed.” . . . Even the Circuit
Court, which ultimately held that there was no “demand,” agreed that
“any reasonable person looking at PNC’s correspondence would
understand that PNC Bank was not going to release funds until all of the
beneficiaries had signed off on this agreement.”111
The Hastings dissent relied on the opinion of PNC’s own in-house counsel,
who had previously written that “it may be ‘time consuming and difficult to get
beneficiaries to understand’ the process of trust termination. But, as a trustee,
PNC owes trustee beneficiaries the duty to provide full and complete
information.”112 In the Hastings case, PNC narrowly escaped a surcharge for
allegedly failing in its fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries.113 Thus, subsequent
cases in this area may spell the end to a demand for a release prior to an estate
or trust distribution.
IV. CONTRACT LAW AND TRUST LAW CLASHES PRIOR TO THE CREATION OF
THE TRUST
While contract law and trust law principles often conflict at trust termination,
a clash can also occur prior to creating the trust. It is not uncommon, for
instance, for a corporate fiduciary to offer wealth-planning services without
charging an affluent customer.114 The bank uses its customers’ information to
determine which individuals receive an offer.115 While the customer may be
unaware of the likelihood that the creation of a trust will ultimately be advised,
the bank personnel likely already recognize this fact.116
As a preliminary matter prior to the rendering of any services, the customer
will likely be turned over to the trust department, which may ask the customer
111. Id. at 740 (footnotes omitted).
112. Id. 740 n.18 (citation omitted).
113. See id. at 72829 (majority opinion).
114. See Lisa Gerstner, Banks Woo Loyal Customers, KIPLINGER (Mar. 2013), http://
www.kiplinger.com/article/saving/T005-C000-S002-banks-loyal-customers.html.
115. See id. (calling this practice “relationship banking,” in which banks seek out customers to
keep all assets within the same bank).
116. See David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1675, 1712 (2009) (footnote omitted) (noting that many bank patrons start trust accounts after years
of banking with the same institution and years of convincing from the bank).
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to enter into an “agreement” with the bank.117 The customer may or may not be
represented by his or her own attorney.118
The customer may be asked to execute the bank’s standard form of agreement
prior to receiving services, or as part of the rendering of services.119 The bank’s
consideration for the agreement is the bank’s willingness to serve as trustee, or
the services to be rendered to the customer by the bank free of charge.120 The
customer in exchange agrees to the terms of the agreement, which may cover
various matters.121 Some agreements may contain some provisions that favor
the customer, but for the most part, the provisions of the agreement will favor
the bank.122
An example of actual language from this type of agreement follows:
1. Service as trustee. Whenever [X] National Trust Company
[(XNTC)] is serving as trustee of any trust [that may be] established
under this instrument (hereafter, “the Trust”), these provisions,
numbers 1 through 10, shall be applicable and shall supersede any
contrary or conflicting provisions.
2. Affiliate dealings. Notwithstanding any rule of law against selfdealing, divided loyalty, or conflict of interest, [XNTC] is specifically
authorized to invest all or any portion of the Trust assets in mutual
funds or other collective investment vehicles affiliated with [the Y]
Group, Inc. [(an affiliate of XNTC)] and to exercise all rights
connected with the ownership of such investments. In addition,
[XNTC] is specifically authorized to engage affiliated entities to
provide services to the Trust, including, without limitation, brokerage,
custodial, and agency services. [XNTC] shall not be required to
reimburse or credit to the Trust the cost of such services, value of any
benefits, or compensation received by [XNTC] or any of its affiliates
in connection with such investments or services.
3. Administration of nonfinancial assets. [XNTC] shall act primarily
as trustee of assets traded on an established securities exchange.
[XNTC] shall not accept or be responsible for the administration,

117. See id. at 171112.
118. See id. at 1711.
119. Id.
120. See Langbein, supra note 4, at 632 n.31 (“Because trusts originate in gifts, black letter
law has not required consideration . . . . Even when [trustees are not compensated for their services],
the trustee’s promise to hold the property for the beneficiary . . . supplies bargained-for
consideration . . . .”).
121. See How to Establish a Relationship with Our Trust Services, VANGUARD (2013),
http://www.vanguard.com/pdf/eptsb2.pdf (noting that the corporate fiduciary can only assume
trustee duties after the beneficiary signs the trust agreement, which covers trustee services,
responsibility for investing assets, relationship with other affiliates, compensation, and various
other rights and responsibilities).
122. See, e.g., id.
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maintenance, disposition, or sale of real estate, business assets,
tangible personal property, or any other nonfinancial assets not traded
on an established securities exchange, unless expressly agreed to by
[XNTC] in a separate writing. Any Trust asset not accepted by
[XNTC] shall be administered in a separate share of the Trust by and
at the sole discretion of the remaining co-trustee(s), or if there is no
co-trustee then serving, by a trustee who shall be appointed in the
following order: (i) as set forth in the Trust instrument for filling a
vacancy in the office of trustee, (ii) as unanimously agreed to by the
sui juris current eligible income beneficiaries of the Trust, or (iii) as
set forth in state law. Any person or organization may be appointed
as trustee pursuant to this paragraph, notwithstanding any contrary
provision in the Trust instrument.
4. Investment responsibility. [XNTC] shall have the sole authority
and responsibility for the investment and reinvestment of the Trust’s
financial assets and the voting of any proxies and/or execution of any
corporate actions related to such assets.
5. Situs and governing law. The situs of the Trust shall be the county
and state in which the [XNTC] office administering the Trust is
located, and questions relating to the investment or administration of
Trust assets shall be governed by the laws of that state. Questions
relating to the validity of the Trust or to the meaning and effect of its
dispositive terms shall be governed by the law of the state specified in
the Trust instrument, or if no state is specified, by the laws of the state
where the Trust is situated. [XNTC], without approval of any court,
shall have the power, but not the duty, exercisable upon notice to the
current beneficiaries, to change the situs of the Trust at any time and
from time to time, provided that any such change does not frustrate a
material purpose of the Trust.
6. Accountings. [XNTC] may satisfy any reporting and accounting
requirements set forth in the Trust with its customary periodic account
statements.
7. Actions of predecessor trustees. [XNTC] shall have no duty to
investigate the acts or omissions of any predecessor trustee. [XNTC]
shall not be liable for its decision to investigate or not investigate any
predecessor trustee’s administration of the Trust or for the acts or
omissions of any predecessor trustee whether known or unknown to
[XNTC]. The current investment statements of a predecessor trustee
shall constitute an accurate accounting of the principal and income of
the Trust.
8. Right to resign. [XNTC] is authorized, without court approval, to
resign or transfer the trusteeship to a trust company affiliated with
[XNTC] or the [Y] Group, Inc., at any time.
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9. Nonjudicial agreements. [XNTC] is authorized, without court
approval, to enter into binding agreements with the beneficiaries and
co-trustees with respect to any matter involving the administration of
the Trust, provided that any such agreement does not frustrate a
material purpose of the Trust or violate state law.
10. Compensation. [XNTC] shall be entitled to receive (a)
compensation for its services in accordance with its schedule of fees
in effect from time to time, without reduction for any other fees or
compensation paid to [XNTC] or its affiliates, and (b) reimbursement
for expenses properly incurred in the administration of the Trust,
including, but not limited to, accounting and attorney fees.123
Although the trust department may later inform the customer that he or she
must retain an independent attorney for the actual drafting of the trust,124 the
mandatory inclusion of items in the earlier executed agreement may be done
without benefit of independent counsel if the settlor does not have her own
attorney or wish to retain an attorney at that time.125 Even if an independent
attorney is representing the customer before the agreement is executed, unless
that attorney is willing to risk the wrath of the corporate fiduciary, little objection
can be expected because an attorney may be recommended by the corporate
fiduciary from a group of independent attorneys.126 The attorneys in the
recommended group may also be on the bank’s approved list of attorneys
authorized to engage in other work for the bank.127 Furthermore, an attorney
may choose not to risk being disfavored by the bank for questioning the terms
of the agreement. The bank may also make additional suggestions with regard
to drafting the trust. For example, the bank may require an exoneration clause
or a termination fee clause.128 The settlor, or her attorney, may accept these
clauses without objection. Under the objective theory of contracts, there is no
requirement that one must intend or even understand the legal consequences of

123. Id.
124. For example, the drafting of a will or a trust constitutes the practice of law and can only
be done by an independent attorney. FAQ’s, GUARANTY BANK & TR. CO., https://www.guaranty
bankco.com/wealthmanagement/planningresources/frequentlyaskedquestions.aspx (last visited
May 11, 2015).
125. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
126. See Horton, supra note 116, at 1711.
127. See Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices—Is
Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 11519 (1984) (outlining the common practice
and the ethical implications of corporate fiduciaries asking the attorney who scripted the trust to
fulfill all duties associated with the administration of the trust).
128. See Jeffrey M. Sklarz & Robert Whitman, Are Percentage Trust Termination Fees
Appropriate?, PROB. & PROP., Nov.Dec. 2001, at 4952 (discussing the increasing trend of
corporate fiduciaries to include the termination-fee clause in a trust).
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one’s actions when entering a trust agreement.129 It is noteworthy that the “intent
of the settlor” gained from the trust provisions, seen as one of the most important
matters in trust law,130 may often express the intentions of the trustee or the
compliant drafting attorney rather than the actual intentions of the settlor.
At what point does trust law, requiring adherence to full fiduciary duties by
the fiduciary, take effect? Few cases have arisen in which the trust beneficiaries
question the procedures described above and assert the breach of fiduciary duties
prior to the actual start of the trust’s operation, but the rise of such litigation in
this area may be forthcoming.
V. THE UTC REQUIRES MANDATORY NOTIFICATIONS TO BENEFICIARIES
REGARDING THE TRUST
Notice to beneficiaries may be required at the start or end of trust
administration or at various stages of administration.131 The UTC has substantial
mandatory-reporting requirements.132 Unfortunately, perhaps mostly due to
pressure brought on by corporate fiduciaries, the UTC disclosure provisions
have been largely rejected by jurisdictions adopting other portions of the
UTC.133 Such jurisdictions have sharply narrowed the scope of these provisions
by “elect[ing] to either delete the provisions altogether or modify the[m].”134
Notably, commentators who do not favor mandatory-disclosure provisions, or
do not acknowledge that disclosure goes to the essence of beneficiary protection,
use one or more of the following arguments to support their position:
1. The overriding purpose of any uniform act is to achieve uniformity
among the states135 (implying that bad law backed by strong interests
capable of gaining support from state legislatures should be the
standard for promulgating uniform laws).
129. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS § 4.26 (3d ed. 2013) (“[T]he objective
theory of contracts imposes no requirement that one intend or even understand the legal
consequences of one’s actions, [and therefore] one is not entitled to relief merely because one
neither read the standard form nor considered the legal consequences of adhering to it.”).
130. See Benjamin D. Patterson, Note, The Uniform Trust Code Revives the Historical
Purposes of Trusts and Reiterates the Importance of the Settlor’s Intent, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV.
905, 910, 932 (2010) (noting that the UTC codified the common law doctrine that the settlor’s
intent be the driving force for interpretation of trust provisions).
131. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(a), (c) (amended 2004)
132. Id. (providing reporting requirements of trustees to beneficiaries at the beginning, during,
and at the termination of a trust).
133. John Spencer Treu, The Mandatory Disclosure Provisions of the Uniform Trust Code:
Still Boldly Going Where No Jurisdiction Will Follow—A Practical Tax-Based Solution, 82 MISS.
L.J. 597, 60001 (2013) (noting that even the jurisdictions that have incorporated the UTC into
their jurisprudence have largely rejected the provisions mandating communication with
beneficiaries).
134. Id. at 600.
135. Id. at 64345.
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2. Non-disclosure to beneficiaries better serves the settlor’s intent.
However, these commentators fail to acknowledge the reality that it is
often a corporate fiduciary, or counsel for the settlor, who inserts
provisions for non-disclosure into the governing instruments, or
follows state law sought by corporate fiduciary committees without
ensuring that the settlor understands the issue.136
3. Settlors actually prefer non-disclosure to beneficiaries.137
4. Disclosure (one of the basic requirements for a valid trust) is
unneeded “reform.”138
5. The underlying common law of trusts should be disregarded.139
6. Disclosure requirements found in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
may be disregarded.140
7. The use of a trust protector or some other questionable substitute
might pass muster.141
Interestingly, one critic of disclosure to trust beneficiaries noted that, in spite
of state legislation omitting the UTC provision for disclosure, state courts may
still require disclosure by relying on other UTC sections or the common law.142
VI. CONCLUSION
At both the creation and termination of the trust, and periodically throughout
trust administration, contract law principles favoring the corporate fiduciary may
be applied.143 Current law generally deems these practices acceptable and
enforceable. In practice, no customer or beneficiary may claim the right to strike
contract clauses, despite those provisions clearly favoring the corporate
fiduciary.
Under contract law, whether the bank’s customer actually reads and
understands the solicited agreement will not matter—the provisions of the
agreement will be held to constitute the actual intent of the customer.144
Nonetheless, depending on the circumstances, a court may be creative in order
136. See id. at 62426.
137. See id. at 63032.
138. Id. at 644.
139. See id. at 626.
140. Cf. David M. English, Uniform Trust Code (2002): Significant Provisions and Policy
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 148 (2002) (noting that courts often adopt rules rather than a practice
described in a Restatement).
141. Treu, supra note 133, at 63640 (noting the growing body of commentary suggesting that
trust protectors may effectively carry out the settlor’s intent without mandatory disclosure
requirements).
142. Id. at 607 (noting two jurisdictions that relied on other UTC sections to ensure mandatory
disclosure to beneficiaries).
143. See supra notes 11316, 12829 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 7576, 129 (providing relevant case law and describing the objective
theory of contracts used to uphold the signing of the document rather than actual intent).
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to arrive at a fair result. Future litigation will determine whether contract law or
trust law principles prevail. Because of the expense of litigation, the
appropriateness of bank conduct as a fiduciary or an expected fiduciary may
often go untested.
Is it reasonable to expect that future outcomes of litigation will clarify the law,
and that courts’ findings of breaches of fiduciary duties may change present
practices? Even where pressure from banks causes state legislatures to enact
statutes blatantly favoring corporate fiduciaries, should there be obvious
injustice done to beneficiaries, an equity court may decide to go against the
corporate fiduciary and, in scrutinizing conduct, expanding the scope of
fiduciary duty, and calculating damages, send a message to the corporate
fiduciary community.
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